THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ... : ABORTION POLITICS & THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY by Burkstrand-Reid, Beth
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
College of Law, Faculty Publications Law, College of 
2011 
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ... : ABORTION POLITICS & THE 
REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Beth Burkstrand-Reid 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bburkstrand-reid2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub 
 Part of the Legal Studies Commons 
Burkstrand-Reid, Beth, "THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ... : ABORTION POLITICS & THE REGULATION OF 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY" (2011). College of Law, Faculty Publications. 77. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/77 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Law, Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ... : ABORTION
POLITICS & THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid*
Abortion and assisted reproductive technology ("ART") may seem
paradoxical in reproductive health: a woman seeks to terminate a pregnancy in
the first, while a woman goes through herculean attempts to attain one in the
latter.' In fact, they share fundamental concerns: women's health and autonomy.
Both include medical procedures, with potential health risks and benefits, and
both help a woman choose whether and when to become a mother.2 Abortion
and ART share another commonality: when these issues enter public and political
discourse, consideration of women's health often recedes into the background.
This response to the articles by June Carbone 3 and Jody Lyne6 Madeira4
suggests that issues central to the development of abortion-related regulation and
jurisprudence have the potential to drive the development of ART and related
law.5 First, like abortion, ART is available to a limited number of women.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. J.D.,American University
Washington College of Law; B.A., Emory University. Many thanks to June Carbone, Jody Lyne6
Madeira and Brian Reid for their assistance with this project.
1 This is an incorrect assumption. For example, there is a direct relationship between the increasing
incidence of multiple gestation pregnancies and the use of selective reduction abortion. Dr. Jerry
Menikoff, Less Bull. Better Bioethics, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1133, 1142-43 (2005).
2 Pregnancy and childbirth carry significant health risks to a pregnant woman. See Beth A.
Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health
Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97 (2010). Fertility treatments also present health risks.
Michelle Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory Choice of
Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 24-29 (2005) (providing examples of injuries associated
with ART procedures); American Society for Reproductive Medicine, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 12-14 (2008),
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/Resources/PatientResources/FactSheets an
d_InfoBooklets/ART.pdf; American Society For Reproductive Medicine, PATIENT FACT SHEET:
RISKS OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (IVF) (2007),
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM Content/Resources/PatientResources/FactSheetsan
d_InfoBooklets/risksofivf.pdf (listing possible complications including blood clots, kidney failure,
injury to organs, infection, risks from cesarean sections, as well as risks from multiple pregnancies,
including hemorrhage, diabetes, and high blood pressure); JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAw 706-09 (2006) (discussing health risks from ART treatment and from
multiple pregnancies).
3 June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage Unnecessary Risks?, 79
UMKC L. REV. 333 (2010).
4 Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Conceivable Changes: Effectuating Infertile Couples' Emotional Ties to
Frozen Embryos Through New Disposition Options, 79 UMKC L. REV. 315 (2010).
5 Abortion and ART each have produced an extensive literature that would be impossible to review
in one essay. Some examples of the literature exploring the links between ART and abortion
include Jennifer Baker, A War of Words: How Fundamentalist Rhetoric Threatens Reproductive
Autonomy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 671, 693-98 (2009) (asserting that IVF-related rhetorical shifts reflect
abortion controversies); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1015 (2010); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Making Mommies: Law, Pre-Implantation
Genetic Diagnosis, and the Complications of Pre-Motherhood, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 313,
351-61 (2008) (saying that abortion-related regulations and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
Burkstrand-Reid in UMKC Law Review (2011) 79. Copyright 2011, University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School. Used by permission.
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Abortion restrictions weigh most heavily on women of lesser financial means, for
whom ART is also largely unavailable. Second, if new reproductive technology
spurs greater regulation, as it has in the abortion context, that regulation may be
driven by politics in lieu of or in addition to true health concerns. To an extent,
this is already occurring. Ideologies influence the regulation of embryo
destruction, a core issue in ART, just as they do with abortion and its attendant
"informed consent" requirements.8 In neither context is women's health-or her
reproductive autonomy-the central concern.9 Part I of this article briefly
explains the technology at issue in the articles by Carbone and Madeira and
summarizes the central points of each. Part II describes how ART regulation
may mirror abortion-related regulations.' 0 Part III concludes by discussing
potential public policy implications of the relationship between these aspects of
women's reproductive health.
I. CARBONE'S AND MADEIRA'S CONTRIBUTIONS
Carbone's and Madeira's articles focus on advancing ART, paying
particular attention to a new procedure through which doctors may be able to
create an egg with mitochondrial DNA from one woman and nuclear DNA from
the fertilized egg of another in hopes of achieving a pregnancy and, subsequently,
a child." The intervention used to address mitochondrial DNA defects relies on
techniques, broadly construed, similar to those involved in cloning. According to
Carbone, it uses the same process involved to produce a clone-transfer of a
wrestle with the same "moral ambiguity and conflict"); Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART
(Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect them From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L.
REv. 57, 73-75 (2004) (arguing that the politics of abortion preclude meaningful regulation of ART
in the United States); Elyse Whitney Grant, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of Reproductive
Technologies Regulation: A Bioethical Approach, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 998-1002 (2009)
(discussing the relationship between abortion jurisprudence and ART); Jody Lyned Madeira,
COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS: RECONCILING LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF WOMEN IN THE INFERTILITY
AND ABORTION CONTEXTS 4 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1 565172 (discussing woman-protective
discourse in abortion and infertility). This article seeks to add to that literature as it relates to
Carbone's and Madeira's articles specifically.
6 See infra Part II.A.
7 One example of this is the approval of the "abortion pill" which allows women to terminate a
pregnancy by taking oral medication. See generally, Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug
Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
571 (2001) (outlining the history of the approval of the abortion pill including manufacturer's fear
that pro-life protestors would threaten employees and production).
8 Physicians should of course comport with standard informed consent requirements and provide
women seeking an abortion with unbiased and accurate health information.
9 This article takes as a given that both abortion and ART are part of comprehensive reproductive
health services, though that stance is not universally held.
1o If abortion-like regulations are increasingly used in the ART context, women's health may likely
be undervalued, just as it is in other reproductive health contexts. See generally Burkstrand-Reid,
supra note 2.
" Carbone, supra note 3; Madeira, supra note 4.
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nucleus from one cell to another-but, because mitochondrial DNA therapy uses
the nucleus of a fertilized egg rather than the nucleus of a somatic cell from an
existing adult, the procedure involves fewer developmental risks to a resulting
fetus.12 It is for this reason-the direct connection to the hot-button issue of
human cloning-that this particular technique has the potential to galvanize
public opinion in a way similar to abortion."
Carbone suggests that, given the lack of oversight of ART, a
fundamental decision looms: should the use and development of ART be
regulated or should it be allowed to evolve with little oversight?l 4 In posing that
question, she raises issues central to many reproductive health issues, abortion
included: should technologies that may present risks to women's health be
permitted, restricted or banned, and by whom should that decision be made? 5
Are market forces adequate to address thorny ethical and medical questions
presented by the medical treatment, or should other regulatory regimes respond
to the questions presented by new technology?16 Carbone asserts that public
regulation carries with it at least three possible risks: (1) the prospect of
discrimination against non-traditional families,17  (2) the possibility of
technologies being abandoned due to politically motivated bans or to the cost of
development, and (3) its potential impact on service availability and cost.' 9
Some of the risks Carbone identifies in the context of ART regulation have
already been realized in the abortion context: limited availability of services
because of service cost, geographically constrained availability, limited insurance
coverage and public funding, and bans or restrictions on certain procedures
motivated by concern for the fetus (even when those actions threaten maternal
health and autonomy).2 o Ultimately, Carbone concludes that the future of a
regulatory regime governing ART is difficult to predict.21 She hypothesizes,
however, that political forces make regulation unlikely in the absence of
individual state action or international pressure to address compelling health
22
risks. Short of federal regulation, she predicts that private norms will likely fill
the regulatory void because fertility tourism makes state regulations relatively
12 Carbone, supra note 3, at 9-10 & n.58.
13 According to Carbone, cloning is controversial for many reasons, and the majority of those
reasons fall into three main categories: first, cloning raises the specter of "unnatural" human
beings; second, embryo destruction is likely to be part of the nuclear transfer process; and third,
genuine concerns about safety arise from the unregulated scientific research in this arena. Id.
14 Id. at 15.
's Id. at 22-23.
16 Id. at 16. See generally NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET
NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION (2009).
" Id. at 23-24.
'
1 Id. at 16.
* Id. at 13.20 See generally Burkstrand-Reid, supra note 2.
21 Carbone, supra note 3, at 27.
22 Id. at 26.
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easy to evade for those with the financial means. This outcome is not without its
concerns, as private norms are neither universally applied nor enforced.23
Madeira focuses on the emotional attachment couples form to their
24
embryos and whether that attachment changes in particular ART contexts.
Specifically, Madeira examines the emotional attachments that may form to
"excess" embryos and whether new technologies, most notably cytoplasm
donations and pronuclear transfer, might change how couples treat the decisions
related to their excess embryos. 2 5 As part of her research, she highlights the
significance of emotional bonding to early developing embryos seen via
ultrasound (which, as we will see in the case of abortion, may be compelled by
regulation). 26 The article concludes with some irony, however, that emotional
attachment combined with altruistic motives for donation in the IVF context may
motivate greater interest in donation so that some part of the embryo will live on,
a concept that runs counter to motivations in the abortion context.27
Together, the articles suggest that women may be eager to take
advantage of new reproductive technology but that the industry is devoid of
regulations to ensure women's safety or public monies to broaden access to it.
II. ABORTION AND ART: STORIES IN SIMILARITIES?28
There are many parallels between the issues that confront abortion and
assisted reproduction. Given that ART is the proverbial new kid on the block, it
may be abortion that shows it the ropes. The notable similarities between
abortion regulation, mitochondrial DNA therapy and, more generally, ART
suggests that emerging ART techniques have the potential to fundamentally
change the nature and timing of when women become "mothers," socially and
legally. Specifically, expanding ART techniques raises important questions
about the availability of these services and how they will be regulated and to
what end.
A. Accessibility
An obvious-yet still weighty-issue that emerged in the abortion
debate and is equally as relevant in the context of ART is the availability of the
medical procedures at issue. While there is need for both abortion and infertility
2 Id. at 26.
24 Madeira, supra note 4.
25 Id. at 4.
2 6 Id. at 5 & n. 27.
7 Id. at 17.
28 Whether an embryo should have (or has) rights in personhood is not a central concern of Carbone
and Madeira's articles. Nonetheless it has been raised vis-i-vis the abortion debate. See, e.g.,
Christina Zampus & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right-International and Regional
Standards, 8 HuM. RTs. L. REv. 249, 266-67 (2008) (noting the similarities between embryonic
right-to-life claims and pro-life claims in the abortion realm).
364 [Vol. 79:2
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treatment, similar forces threaten the availability of each. The ability to access
abortion and ART is constricted by geographic location and financial means.2 9
Given that availability of ART is already limited, additional regulation that
affects such services-directly or indirectly-has the potential to further harm
women.
Both abortion and fertility treatment are needed health services for
women nationwide, yet their availability is geographically restricted.3 0 Abortion
is unavailable or of limited availability for a significant portion of women simply
because of where they live.3 1 Almost half of all pregnancies in the United States
are unintended; forty percent of unintended pregnancies are aborted and twenty-
two percent of all pregnancies (miscarriages excluded) end by abortion.32 Still,
the availability of abortion services in the United States is limited when looked at
on a county-by-county basis: in 2005, eighty-seven percent of all U.S. counties-
including more than one-third of all American women-had no abortion
provider.33 Similarly, the availability of assisted reproductive health technology
providers is geographically constrained: clinics are heavily clustered on the
coasts and several states have only one or no clinics.34 This lack of availability
exists despite the fact that in one single year, approximately 1.2 million women
sought fertility-related medical assistance. (Undoubtedly, many more women
needed, but could not access, ART and abortion services.)
Geography is only an issue, of course, for those women who do not have
the means to seek services far away from where they live. For those unable to
travel, ART (and abortion) is not only bounded by geography but also by cost.
"In 2005, the cost of a nonhospital abortion with local anesthesia at 10 weeks'
gestation ranged from $90 to $1,800; the average amount paid was $413.""
Almost half "of women obtaining abortions have incomes below 100% of the
federal poverty level ($10,830 for a single woman with no children). Twenty-
seven percent of women obtaining abortions have incomes between 100-199% of
the federal poverty level."3 ART takes the issue of cost to a different level. By
one estimate, a single cycle of in vitro fertilization, for example, costs between
29 See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight is Enough, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 501
(2009). See infra notes 30-35.
30 Guttmacher Institute, An Overview of Abortion in the United States,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb inducedabortion.htmi (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Section 1-Overview, 2007 ART REPORT,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2007/sectl-figl-4.htm#Figurel [hereinafter 2007 ART REPORT].
3 Guttmacher Institute, An Overview of Abortion in the United States, supra note 30.
32 id.
33 Id.
34 2007 ART REPORT, supra note 30. The CDC estimates that slightly more than one percent of all
live births in the U.S. were conceived via ART. Id.
3 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND WOMEN'S
HEALTH: NEW DATA FROM THE 1995 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH (1997),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalseries/sr_23/sr23_01 9.pdf.
36 Guttmacher Institute, An Overview of Abortion in the United States, supra note 30.
3 See id.
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$7,000 and $11,000.38 This cost puts infertility services simply beyond the
means of many women: one study suggested that "financial access is the most
serious barrier to seeking and receiving [infertility] treatment."" Availability-
simply from a socioeconomic standpoint-is limited for both services.40
Additionally, ART may face a tipping point of public opinion that pushes
it into broad and deep public regulation, as did abortion.4 1 For abortion, that
tipping point was arguably the "partial-birth" abortion debate.4 2  So-called
"partial-birth" abortion galvanized the abortion-rights debate by focusing on
what was presented as one procedure that accomplished its ends through
particularly gruesome means. The possibility that one aspect of ART-the fact
that ART uses cloning-analogous technology-could become a tipping point in
the debate is not far-fetched.43 As Madeira suggests, the word "clone," which
sometimes arises in the context of ART, makes people nervous, to say the least."
A cloning-related technology, with its potential to conjure gruesome (even if
inaccurate) words and images, could, like "partial-birth" abortion, quickly
galvanize public opinion against ART, thus bringing increased regulation (and
decreased availability) to fruition.4 5 That push-back on availability could come
in the form of limitations on insurance coverage or public funding of services.46
And, as Carbone warns, increased regulation in the United States could drive
some people to seek certain ART services overseas,4 7 further widening the divide
38 Tarun Jain, M.D. et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 661, 661 (2002), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsa013491.
39 J. Farley Ordovensky Stanic & Natalie J. Webb, Utilization of Infertility Services: How Much
Does Money Matter?, 42 HEALTH SERVICE RES. 971, 985 (2007), available at
http://www.nebi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1955265/pdflhesT042-0971.pdf.
40 Carbone, supra note 3, at 13, 36.
41 Or, it may in fact be that the vitriolic abortion debate has diverted attention from ART, allowing
it to prosper with little oversight. See, e.g., Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing the Market for Human
Reproductive Tissue Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs But Not Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 643, 676 (2008).
42 See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional
Common Law, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519 (2008).
43 See Rosato, supra note 5, at 73-75. Publicity surrounding mulitigestational pregnancies like that
of "Octomom" Nadya Suleman and Kate Gosselin of Jon & Kate Plus 8 could have been a tipping
point, but most efforts to regulate implantation of multiple embryos have been defeated. See, e.g.,
Cahn & Collins, supra note 29; Carbone & Cahn, supra note 5, at 1041-45 (discussing state
legislative attempts at ART regulation).
4 Carbone, supra note 3, at 9.
45 To an extent, this is already happening. See, e.g., Dolly the Sheep Dies Young, BBC NEWS
WORLD EDITION, Feb. 14, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilscience/nature/2764039.stm (noting
that Dolly's death brough to light questions about cloning a human baby); Not Waiting for
Congress to Act, Some States Move to Ban Human Cloning, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB.
POL'Y, Feb. 2002, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/05/1/grO50113.html.
4 See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn, supra note 5, at 1032-33 (asserting ART funding suffers from the
same divisive issues as abortion); GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, RESTRICTING INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
ABORTION AS OF AUG. 1, 2010, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibRICA.pdf
(describing regulation of insurance covering abortion services).
47 Carbone, supra note 3, at 24 n.122.
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between those wealthy enough to access medical care abroad and those for whom
the procedures are financially unavailable.
Once the morality-based regulatory door is wide open, regulations too
numerous to count may come to fruition.4 8 For example, restrictions on ART
may be passed purportedly to protect the health of the fetus or woman, but in
reality they may restrict availability in a way that threatens women's health, as is
the case in the abortion context.4 9  Limited availability of abortion and ART
procedures threaten women's health and reproductive autonomy now.
Contemplating the similarities between abortion and ART brings into sharp focus
the potential future of availability of ART.
B. "Informed" consent
Assuming that a more comprehensive regulatory system is imposed on
ART, lawmakers may borrow extensively from abortion regulation as both
technologies (1) involve medical procedures that (2) concern irresolvable moral
debates about when life begins and that (3) women of varying demographics seek
to access.so ART regulation, if it is based even partially on abortion regulation,
may include targeted regulation of ART facilities, limitations on types of
procedures, when they are available and to whom, and a host of other measures
designed either to protect women or to promote a political agenda, depending
upon your point of view." One still-evolving abortion regulation that merits
scrutiny in terms of its possible applicability to ART is what some call "informed
consent" laws.
Many states require that women hear, read or be presented with state-
authored information prior to an abortion; this information varies by state, but
may include suggestions that women suffer mental health consequences, that the
fetus feels pain during the procedure, and even erroneous information that
48 Some scholars, however, think that abortion politics have actually caused the lack of ART
regulation. Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted Reproductive Technology in
the United Kingdon and the United States, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 419, 433 (2005).
49 Inaccurate information on the health risks of abortion to the pregnant woman is often presented
as part of the "informed consent" process. See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State
Abortion Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, GUTrMACHER
POL'Y REVIEW 6 (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/4/gprl00406.pdf.
50 As Carbone explains, to some extent, ART is already regulated. The issue is how further
regulation will develop. See Carbone, supra note 3. See also 0. Carter Snead, Science, Public
Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1529, 1542 (2010) (noting state
regulation of ART).
5 The many individual ways in which abortion regulation may be co-opted by anti-assisted
reproduction activists is vast. For a comprehensive list of abortion regulation in the United States,
see GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS (Oct. 1,
2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibOAL.pdf; see also Harper Jean Tobin,
Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111 (2008) (asserting that information on fetal pain presented to women
seeking abortion is unconstitutional).
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abortion is linked with cancer.52 Some lawmakers and anti-abortion rights
activists call these "informed consent" s3 requirements, while abortion rights
advocates call them "biased counseling." 5 4 "Informed consent" laws, when
combined with mandatory waiting periods before a woman can have an abortion,
increase the gestational age of the fetus and therefore increase the health risks to
the pregnant woman and the costs of the procedure.ss
Traditional abortion-related "informed consent" regulations,
accomplished via paper handouts given to a patient or a conversation held with a
medical professional, have been augmented with a newer, more creative (and
arguably ideologically-motivated) "informed consent" technique which requires
no written words, only an image.56 Twenty states have regulations that promote
the use of ultrasounds as a form of "informed consent," ostensibly with the aim
of discouraging abortion.57 Some of these states require abortion providers to
perform an ultrasound on a woman and offer her the opportunity to see it prior to
termination; others require the same if the abortion is to be performed after the
first trimester; still others require physicians who perform an ultrasound to offer
to describe the ultrasound to the woman; and even more variations on ultrasound-
related laws exist.58 In Oklahoma, for example, a law was passed mandating that,
at least one hour prior to an abortion, the physician show the woman an
ultrasound image of the fetus while simultaneously describing the heartbeat and
the size of any visible organs; although the woman could refuse to look, she
would still be forced to listen to the physician's description.
52 Id.
s3 Michele Jackson, Should we Accept Denial of Our Right to Informed Consent About Abortion,
http://www.nrlc.org/news/1999/NRL499/blk.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
54 NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, ACCESS TO ABORTION (2003),
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs-research/publications/downloads/aboutabortion/access-abortion.p
df. See generally Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 223 (2009).
5 See GUrrMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR
ABORFION (Aug. 2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibMWPA.pdf. National
Abortion Federation, In the States: Threats to Abortion Rights/Biased Counseling/Waiting Period
Bills, http://www.prochoice.org/policy/states/biasedcounseling.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
56 This is not to suggest that medically-driven ideologically neutral informed consent has no place
in ART. See DAAR, supra note 2, at 701-03 (discussing informed consent guidance from the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine).
5 See GUTEMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (Oct. 1
2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibRFU.pdf. See generally Carol Sanger,
Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 351, 351 (2008) (detailing the use of mandatory ultrasound prior to abortion).
58 GUTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND, supra note
57.
5 Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U.L. REv.
939, 1001-02 (2009); Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, Judge Blocks Enforcement of
OK Abortion Ultrasound Law (Jul. 19, 2010), available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-
room/judge-blocks-enforcement-of-ok-abortion-ultrasound-law.
[ Vol. 79: 2368
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Unnecessary ultrasounds add to the cost of abortion, and, when
combined with mandatory waiting periods, increase the time it takes to access
abortion services, possibly negatively impacting women's health.60  "Since
routine ultrasound is not considered medically necessary as a component of first-
trimester abortion, the requirements appear to be a veiled attempt to personify the
fetus and dissuade a woman from obtaining an abortion.""
What does ultrasound in the abortion context have to do with ART? A
great deal. Both use pictures in an attempt to define the start of "motherhood"
with many potential consequences.62 In the abortion context, "technology and
the practice of ultrasound have transformed the fetus from potential life to
something that can have its picture taken" a step "perhaps as close to a marker of
personhood as one can get."63 Pre-abortion ultrasound is a transparent attempt to
force motherhood on a woman who has chosen not to accept that role at that
time." In ART, as Madeira explains, "[flertility clinics foster emotional
connection to embryos by giving intended mothers pictures of transferred
embryos and by encouraging them to watch the transplantation procedure on an
ultrasound screen-and perhaps even giving them an ultrasound picture of the
newly-transferred embryos 'at home' in the uterus."6 s
There are differences in ultrasounds in these contexts, however. First, a
woman viewing a pre-abortion ultrasound may see a fetus, while a woman
viewing an ART-related ultrasound sees much less. 6 Moreover, the manner in
which ultrasounds are used in the abortion context is an overt attempt by the state
to coerce women into becoming mothers. As doctors in fertility centers
undoubtedly must know, showing a woman a picture of an embryo can induce a
woman to feel like a mother instantaneously.68 Any coercion in the context of
ART, if it exists at all, is much less apparent. 69 And, in the fertility context is
6 National Abortion Federation, In the States: Threats to Abortion Rights/Biased
Counseling/Waiting Period Bills, http://www.prochoice.org/policy/states/biased-counseling.html
(last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
61 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND, supra note
57.
62 Sanger, supra note 57, at 379-93.
1 Id. at 379.
6 See generally id.
65 Madeira, supra note 4, at 5.
6 For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the abortion, cloning, and stem cell
research debates generally, see Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and
Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 101 (2003).
67 See Corbin, supra note 59, at 998-1011 and accompanying notes (noting that the most effective
ultrasound in the first trimester requires a probe be inserted in the pregnant woman's vagina).
68 As Michelle Goodwin points out, ART is "romanticized through photographic imagery ....
Images of happy, middle class white parents, sometimes with their new families, give an unrealistic
illustration of ART." Goodwin, supra note 2, at 40.
69 And in fact, it is unclear that coercion exists at all. As Madeira says, ART patients want to get
pregnant. Madeira, supra note 4, at 14-15. Coercion may come in, however, when determining
how many embryos to transfer.
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certainly not state-mandated and is done in the context of trying to achieve a
birth, not ending one-though this could certainly change.
Nonetheless, the use of ultrasounds, when examined together in both
contexts, demonstrates that regulations, technology and context can be combined
to alter the way in which women define themselves-as mothers or not. Aside
from expanding the use of ultrasound technology, ART regulations may
capitalize on this demonstrated connectivity in other ways. Will the purpose of
further informed consent in ART be used to preserve embryonic life, to prevent it
or both? In the abortion context, in 2007, for example, South Carolina
considered requiring women to view ultrasound images prior to having an
abortion.70 Similarly, might the state require women to look at the eggs or
embryos to further foster maternal attachment? This is not a question without
real-world implications; such a policy has the potential to decrease selective
reduction, deter destruction of "excess" embryos or discourage termination in the
presence of fetal defects.
III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Today, whether and when a woman becomes a mother is both an
individual and a public determination.7 ' Regardless of whether it is abortion or
ART, there is a strong social desire to control women's decisions regarding
pregnancy and motherhood.
As previously mentioned, in the context of ART, the technology itself-
including ultrasound-has the ability to push the point of motherhood back,
even, as Madeira acknowledges, to a point prior to conception, thereby propelling
ART advocates to recognize "life" extremely early.72 As Madeira points out, the
vast array of issues that motherhood (or potential motherhood) presents in the
context of ART are based both on the woman's emotional attachment to the
embryo at issue and efforts by physicians to foster attachment at earliest stages of
70 Sanger, supra note 57, at 393.
71 Carbone's analysis of the implications of ART, for example, starts by looking at the public and
scientific acceptability of the underlying procedure (such as specific ART procedures and abortion
procedures, including "partial-birth" abortion) while Madeira concentrates on the acceptability of
the disposal of embryos in accordance with public emotive norms. Carbone, supra note 3, at 3-6;
Madeira, supra note 4, at 8-9. For discussions on mothering and reproductive technology, see
Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line-or the Curtain?-For Reproductive
Technology, 32 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 59 (2009) and Mutcherson, supra note 5.
72 See Madeira, supra note 4, at 11. Other academics assert that pregnant women do not bond with
a fetus until they know the results of the prenatal screening and that, in fact, fear over the results
may lead women to delay prenatal care. Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of
Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 980, 984-85 (1996). Defining "motherhood" is, itself, a subject
of academic discourse. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 429 (2007).
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ART procedures.73 Women (and their physicians and advocates) may identify
themselves as a mother prior to conception.
In the abortion context, women are also encouraged (if not coerced) to
accept the role of "mother" at an early stage of pregnancy. This is accomplished
by state regulations, including ultrasound requirements, designed to foster
emotional attachment to the fetus. However, unlike women using ART, women
seeking abortion (and their advocates) likely will try to push "motherhood"
further into the future. This suggests that women may become opposing forces,
unwittingly working against one another and potentially decreasing women's
reproductive health services, which has the potential to be bad for all women.
Any individual woman might need fertility services, abortion services or both,
either during the same pregnancy (e.g. selective reduction of fetuses in the case
of multifetal pregnancies) or at different times in her life.74
Moreover, while the availability of ART should increase the number of
women who can conceive, when turned on its head, the availability (or future
requirement) of ART-related genetic testing prior to conception may actually
reduce the pool of women who become mothers. ART may produce an expanded
ability to determine prenatal fetal defects and ultimately lead to such testing
being required, either by private norms or by public regulation, in any
pregnancy-ART conceived or not.7 ' As is the case with any genetic testing, by
requiring women to see themselves as mothers at such an early point, women
hypothetically may be discouraged or prohibited from pregnancy. As Madeira
discusses, assisted reproductive technologies such as pronuclear transfer may
compel a "good" mother to use genetic testing to determine her genetic suitability
for motherhood.7 6 It is a safe assumption that some women, armed with the
knowledge that there are genetic issues that may complicate pregnancy or
childrearing, will forgo childbearing. This may especially be the case given
recent legislature proposals that would allow doctors to limit the communication
of information about potential birth defects in order to prevent abortion. A law
passed in Oklahoma would grant physicians who do not inform prospective
parents that a fetus has birth defects immunity from malpractice suits.77
Assuming that a woman desires and is able to mother to begin with, mandatory
genetic testing, ultrasounds, abortion regulation, and tort immunity may, in fact,
7 See Madeira, supra note 4, at 5.
74 See Siddharth Khanijou, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction in Assisted Reproductive Technologies:
A License to Kill?, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 403 (2005).
7 Andrews, supra note 72, at 972 (saying that the lower risks of a newer prenatal diagnosis
technique may lead to mandated testing). Some clinics are planning on using pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis to allow prospective parents to choose their children's traits. See, e.g., Gautam
Naik, A Baby, Please. Blond, Freckles-Hold the Colic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2009, at Al0,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123439771603075099.html.
76 See Madeira, supra note 4, at 2.
n Adam Weinstein, Oklahoma: Pro-Life Nanny State, MOTHER JONES, Apr. 28, 2010,
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/04/oklahoma-pro-life-nanny-state-abortion-birth-defect-doctor-
malpractice-ultrasound.
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stop abortion-but also may decrease pregnancy.78 Therefore, expanding ART
techniques and related testing-technologies that are meant to increase the pool
of parents, regardless of conception method-may, in the end, contract it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Comparing abortion and ART-especially controversial techniques like
cytoplasm donation-may be detrimental to both. Each technology forces
society to confront the deepest issues concerning the beginning of life and, for
women, forces them to consider when motherhood begins and what
responsibilities might flow from it. Abortion rights advocates must push the
inception of motherhood to a point as late in the gestational process as possible
so as to avoid thorny issues of fetal personhood. Fertility doctors and their
patients may have just as strong of an interest in recognizing an earlier start to
motherhood, as a way of gaining or preserving hope during a fragile and
unpredictable process. Regardless of when motherhood begins for these women,
as abortion and ART regulation continue to grow, women may be further
required to subrogate their choices and their health to public determinations of
when a woman should or does becomes a mother.
7A doctor who "caused" a pregnancy by implanting an embryo with a known defect might present
a very different situation.
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